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1. Introduction 
In recent years, China has been shifting from a capital-led towards a more innovation-led 
growth model. Although China reached outstanding output growth of more than 8% annually 
between 1978 and 2007 (Zhu, 2012), more recently the pace of output and productivity growth 
has been slowing down in the overall economy and manufacturing industries (Bai and Zhang, 
2017). This slowdown may be attributed to diminishing returns to higher levels of physical and 
human capital and a deterioration in the efficiency of resource allocation (Wei et al. 2017). As 
China moves closer to the global technology frontier, the creation of domestic innovation is 
seen not only as an important complement to the absorption of technologies developed else-
where, but also as a main driver of productivity and economic growth. The government com-
prehensively supports China’s transformation towards more innovation-led growth with numer-
ous targets and policies (Cao et al., 2013). 
A first-order policy target is to increase research and development (R&D) inputs in 
firms. To this end, the government quadrupled annual R&D subsidies allocated to large and 
medium-sized enterprises (LMEs) between 2000 and 2010, the time period underlying this 
study. Simultaneously, the relative contribution of private R&D investments1 and employment 
of R&D personnel in the business sector increased from around 35% to 54% for investments 
and 36% to 54% for personnel (own calculations). These figures emphasise the importance of 
the corporate sector within China’s innovation system. Against the background of aggregate 
dynamics at the national level, a striking feature of China’s economic development is persistent 
provincial disparities (Tsui, 2014), which are also observable for innovation inputs and output. 
To appropriately consider heterogeneity among provincial production and innovation systems, 
our evaluation of China’s R&D subsidies is conducted at the provincial level.2 
Although it is well known that market failure in the private production of knowledge 
may require an adjustment of private R&D by public subsidies (David et al., 2000), the empir-
ical evaluation literature shows that R&D subsidies could function as both complements and 
substitutes (Zúñiga‐Vicente et al., 2014; Dimos and Pugh, 2016). Most impact evaluations of 
                                                 
1 Following the standard approach in the literature, private R&D investment is calculated by subtracting 
R&D subsidies from total firm R&D expenditures (Dimos and Pugh, 2016). The term “private” corre-
sponds to “net,” “self-financed,” or “own” R&D expenditures and does not discriminate between R&D 
expenditures by state-owned and non-state-owned firms. 
2 In the Chinese context the Annual Survey of Industrial Enterprises from the National Bureau of Sta-
tistics and the Administrative Enterprise Income Tax Records from the Chinese State Administration of 
Tax are sources of micro data for the quasi-population of LMEs. However, these data are not appropriate 
for the proposed evaluation because only total subsidies but not R&D subsidies are observed. In contrast, 
provincial-level data allows us to observe R&D subsidies. 
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public R&D subsidies on private R&D expenditures are conducted for developed economies. 
Until now, only a few studies provide an evaluation for China and the results are somewhat 
inconclusive (see Boeing 2016; Boeing and Peters 2019; Hu and Deng 2019; Liu et al., 2016). 
Chen (2018) is the only study at the provincial level and finds a partial crowding-out effect. 
The contribution of our study is at least twofold: First, we estimate not only direct but 
also indirect effects of R&D subsidies on R&D inputs, which are unobservable in single equa-
tion approaches. Second, we estimate the total (direct plus indirect) effects of R&D subsidies 
on various economic variables in the provincial production system. In this way, we can detect 
secondary effects on the provincial capital deepening, technological progress, labour, and out-
put, and thus draw conclusions on the role of R&D subsidies for the development of provincial 
innovation and economic activities. To this end, we are the first to use a panel vector auto-
regressive (VAR) model and corresponding impulse response function (IRF) analysis to analyse 
the effects of R&D subsidies on the economic performance of Chinese provinces. This econo-
metric approach explicitly allows for the identification of total effects on a defined set of eco-
nomic variables. 
For R&D inputs of LMEs, we find that an increase of R&D subsidies significantly de-
creases private R&D investments, while there is a significant positive effect on the R&D per-
sonnel employed. We interpret these findings as a partial crowding-out effect because firms 
substitute some private funds with public funds but total R&D inputs still increase. Comple-
mentary to this result, we find a positive effect on provincial patents, our measure of techno-
logical progress. Interestingly, we also find some evidence for potentially unintended effects 
because R&D subsidies also increase the investment rate in physical capital and residential 
buildings. Although investments in physical capital may be complementary to R&D in general, 
investments in residential buildings more likely suggest some misallocation of R&D subsidies. 
The remainder of the paper is set out as follows. In Section 2, we review the institutional 
setting and prior studies on R&D subsidies in China. Section 3 provides the theoretical frame-
work. In Section 4, we specify our empirical strategy, data and descriptive statistics. In Section 
5, we present the main results and robustness tests, and discuss our findings and policy impli-
cations. We conclude in Section 6.  
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2.  Institutional setting and prior literature 
According to Romer (1990), business R&D plays an essential role in fostering innovation and 
economic growth. However, market failure in private knowledge production may lead to subop-
timal innovation rates and the deceleration of economic growth. Due to externalities in 
knowledge production that are difficult to internalise, private and social returns to innovation 
activities differ (Arrow, 1962). In conjunction with moral hazard and risky financing of R&D, 
this difference in private and social returns may lead to systematic underinvestment in R&D. 
This market failure may require policy intervention and an upward correction of business R&D 
activities by the provision of public subsidies (David et al., 2000).  
Although governments offer public funding to spur R&D in firms – to incentivise more 
private R&D investments – R&D subsidies might also crowd out private financing of R&D. A 
firm invests in R&D if and as long as the marginal rate of return to R&D is larger or equal to 
the marginal cost of capital. The marginal cost of capital reflects the opportunity costs of in-
vesting funds in R&D versus non-R&D projects and thus depends on, among others, the ex-
pected returns to other uses of available funds, such as investment in physical assets, available 
internal finance, and costs of external capital. Based on a theoretical concept developed by Hall 
(2008), Hottenrott and Peters (2012) show that optimal R&D investment increases only if grant-
ees were initially financially constrained, implying insufficient internal financial means. The 
empirical evaluation literature indeed shows that R&D subsidies may function as both comple-
ments or substitutes, depending and the specific setting, and might have crowding-out, neutral, 
or additionality effects on the private R&D investment of firms (for recent surveys of devel-
oped-country studies see Zúñiga‐Vicente et al., 2014, and Dimos and Pugh, 2016). 
2.1 The institutional setting 
The Chinese State Council aims to develop China into an innovative country by 2020 and a 
world leader in science and technology by 2050. Against this target, China’s ratio of gross 
expenditures for R&D to GDP has already overtaken the ratio of the European Union; and in 
gross R&D expenditures, China is projected to overtake the United States around 2020 (OECD, 
2014). In order to stimulate additional business R&D expenditures, the Chinese government 
invests heavily in innovation policy, e.g. through direct grants and tax incentives. Major na-
tional R&D programmes include the National High-Tech R&D Programme (the 863 Pro-
gramme), the National Key Technologies Programme, and the State Basic R&D Programme 
(the 973 Programme). In addition, firms receive R&D subsidies from programmes administered 
by sub-national agencies. 
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The period we study is of remarkable importance for China’s transformation towards 
innovation-led growth. Between 2000 and 2010, the ratio of total real R&D investments and 
private real R&D investments by LMEs to real GDP has continuously increased and doubled 
between 2000 and 2010 (Figure 1). Given China’s strong growth in GDP over this time period, 
the increase in R&D intensity is even more striking.  
    <<<  Figure 1      >>> 
The major innovation policies in this period are formulated in the 10th and 11th Five-
Year Science and Technology Development Plans (2001-2005 and 2006-2011) and, more im-
portantly, the Mid- to Long-term Science and Technology Development Plan 2006-2020 (MLP). 
The MLP aims to foster R&D expenditures of domestic firms, as well as to better coordinate 
the existing R&D policies to increase the effectiveness of government support (Liu et al., 2011). 
After 2006, a more mission-oriented policy approach was implemented and amendments of 
major national R&D programmes took place, paralleled by substantial increases in government 
funding. Between 2000 and 2010 annual R&D subsidies to LMEs quadrupled from 4.31 to 
16.95 real billion RMB, while the private R&D expenditures of LMEs increased twelvefold 
from 30.84 to 371.86 real billion RMB (Figure 2).3 These efforts lead to a continuous increase 
in the ratio of private firm to total R&D investments as well as the ratio of firm to total R&D 
personnel in China, emphasising the increasing relevance of firms for the China’s innovation 
system (Figure 3). However, the key question to ask is whether R&D subsidies have contributed 
to the rise in private R&D expenditures.  
<<< Figures 2 & 3 >>> 
2.2 Prior Chinese studies 
Most evaluations of the effect of public R&D subsidies on private R&D expenditures, i.e. input 
additionality, are conducted for developed economies. Only a few studies provide an analysis 
for developing economies. In this section, we focus on the Chinese economy and first discuss 
prior firm-level studies and hereafter provincial-level studies.  
For the early period 2001 to 2006, Boeing (2016) estimates the average treatment effect 
on the treated (ATT) and finds a partial crowding-out effect. Liu et al. (2016) observe high-tech 
manufacturing firms in Jiangsu province based on cross-sectional survey data for the year 2012. 
They estimate the ATT and find that grantees increase private R&D expenditures by 14.3%. 
                                                 
3 Using the 2005 RMB-EUR year-end exchange rate, this corresponds to an increase from 3.225 billion 
EUR to 38.888 billion EUR. 
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Hu and Deng (2019) use survey data for private-owned manufacturing firms, observed between 
2007 and 2011, and find that treated firms almost double private R&D expenditures compared 
to the pre-treatment year. Most recently, Boeing and Peters (2019) observe misappropriation of 
R&D subsidies by firms and separately estimate the intention-to-treat (ITT) and complier-av-
erage-causal-effect (CACE). Between 2001 and 2011, they show partial crowding-out for the 
actual effectiveness of R&D policy, whereas the efficacy among compliers (i.e., non-misappro-
priating firms) confirms additionality. In summary, the firm-level evidence so far suggests that 
the effectiveness of grants has increased over time. However, the finding that R&D policy has 
become more effective was only established for certain firm types, which may have resulted in 
more positive results compared to the average treatment effect for the population of firms.4  
To the best of our knowledge, the only province-level study that evaluates input addi-
tionality, the effect of R&D subsidies on R&D expenditures, is Chen (2018). For the population 
of firms, he finds insignificant effects on total R&D expenditures, while the effects on private 
R&D expenditures are significant negative, which one may interpret as evidence for (total) 
crowding-out. All other province-level studies focus on output or behavioral additionality and 
mainly investigate the effect of various innovation policy instruments, e.g. R&D subsidies, tax 
allowances, and public R&D investment, on patenting. As a bottom line, most of these studies 
confirm a positive effect. In addition, we note three important insights. First, variation in policy 
effectiveness may be confounded by heterogeneity across provincial production and innovation 
systems and controlling for heterogeneity across provinces is crucial (Chen et al. 2017, Deng 
et al. 2019, Sun 2000). Second, government policy has a significant positive effect on invention 
patents, which are more closely related to technological progress than utility patents, whereas 
there is no effect on utility patents (Li 2009). Third, while policy could increase inequalities in 
patenting across provinces (Fan et al. 2012), collaboration of firms with universities and re-
search institutes could also reduce provincial innovation disparities (Hong et al. 2019) and pub-
lic R&D subsidies and tax incentives increase the funds devoted to R&D collaborations (Cheng 
and Zhang 2018). Hence, in addition to firms, universities and research institutes play an im-
portant role in provincial innovation systems and failure to account for their R&D expenditures 
may induce omitted variable bias. 
                                                 
4 Beyond input additionality, some studies also investigate output or behavioural additionality. For the 
InnoFund program, Guo et al. (2016) find that grantees significantly increase new product sales, patents 
and exports. Cheng et al. (2019) find that subsidized firms file more domestic but not international pa-
tents and do not yield higher productivity, profits and markups. 
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In a nutshell, prior studies at the provincial level investigate the direct effects of R&D 
subsidies on firms’ R&D input, provincial patenting and other outputs such as new product 
sales. In contrast to the larger number of studies investing output or behavioural additionality 
in China, the lack of studies focusing on input additionality at the province level is striking and 
more research is needed. We aim to contribute to the literature by analysing the total (direct 
plus indirect) effects of R&D subsidies on a larger set of theory-based economic variables, with 
particular emphasis on R&D inputs. For this exercise, we follow recent applications of a VAR 
approach at the regional level (e.g. Ramajo et al., 2017; Mitze et al., 2018; Eberle et al., 2019). 
In the Section 3, we present a theoretical framework that motivates our subsequent empirical 
analysis.  
3. Theoretical framework 
Based on Solow (1956), the theoretical growth literature has emphasised the importance of 
human and physical capital accumulation for economic growth (e.g. Mankiw et al., 1992). Alt-
hough capital deepening is essential for growth in developing economies, with accelerating 
economic development the contribution of capital accumulation decreases while the importance 
of technological progress increases (e.g. Aghion and Howitt, 2009). This is because innovation 
offsets the diminishing returns to capital by a continual rise in technology. Thus, innovation 
drives both technological progress and capital deepening, the two main components of eco-
nomic growth. Once an economy is fully industrialised and has reached the steady state, per 
capita income and growth is solely driven by innovation and technological progress.5 However, 
in the case of China, provincial economies are strongly heterogeneous and display a high level 
of variation regarding the general economic development (Tsui, 2014) and innovation activities 
(Li, 2009). Therefore, we apply a provincial-level analysis to evaluate the outcomes of public 
R&D subsidies in China.  
We assume the following production function for each province i 
    Yi = Kiα Hiβ (Ai λiPi)1-α-β,      (1) 
where Yi is provincial output, Ki provincial physical and Hi human capital, Ai denotes the level 
of the provincial technology, λi is the provincial employment rate, and Pi denotes provincial 
                                                 
5 Whereas Mankiw et al. (1992) assume that technological process is exogenously given and equally 
distributed across economies, Romer’s (1990) growth model explicitly endogenises the accumulation 
processes of technology in a R&D sector. 
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resident population. Decreasing returns to scale are imposed by α > 0, β > 0 and α + β < 1. 
Following Eberle et al. (2019), we specify provincial labour as Li = λiPi, with λi as the in long-
term fixed provincial employment rate (Li
Pi
), while provincial population Pi grows at the exoge-
nous rate ni. By dividing Equation (1) by Pi, the provincial per capita production function can 
be expressed as 
       yi = kiα hiβ (Ai λi)1-α-β.               (2) 
Equation (2) defines the provincial GDP per capita as the output factor, and physical 
and human capital per capita, and the level of technology and the employment rate as core 
production factors in the provincial economic system. Note that, due to data limitations, we use 
the physical capital (fixed assets) investment rate (subsequently labelled as sk,i) instead of the 
physical capital stock (ki) and the technological growth rate (subsequently labelled as gi) instead 
of the provincial technological level (Ai). 
 R&D is a human capital intensive activity (Romer, 1990; Aghion and Howitt, 2009) and 
a substantial share of current business R&D cost are labour cost for internal R&D personnel, 
hence investments in human capital.6 We formulate the dynamics of per capita human capital 
(e.g. Mankiw et al., 1992) as 
    h
.
i
hi
 = sh,i(kiα hiβ-1 (Aiλi)1-α-β) – (ni+δ).         (3) 
In Equation (3), sh,i is the investment rate in human capital that depreciates with a constant rate 
δ (Mankiw et al., 1992). With respect to Equation (3), R&D investments are accounted for by 
sh,i and the R&D personnel is captured by hi. 
 To identify the effects of R&D subsidies (labelled by sh_public,i), we augment our model 
with private R&D investments by LMEs (labelled by sh_private,i). The parameter will be informa-
tive whether or not the crowding-out hypothesis can be rejected. Alternatively, we will also 
augment the model with firms’ R&D personnel (hi).7 If crowding-out cannot be rejected for 
                                                 
6 In developed economies, this share is usually higher than in developing economies. It was 64.5% for 
Germany (in 2011) and 52.3% for the United Kingdom, 44.8% for Japan, 44.1% for Korea, and 30.4% 
for China (all in 2009) (OECD Statistics, 2019). Note that this is only a theoretical assumption; our 
flexible empirical approach accounts for alternative transmission channels of R&D investments (Section 
4.1). 
7 The simultaneous inclusion of both variables (sh,i and hi) would require our model to consider the same 
information twice and should be avoided. The correlation coefficients between the variables R&D per-
sonnel LMEs per capita and private real R&D investments LMEs per real GDP support this concern: ρ1 
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private R&D investments, the parameter for firms’ R&D personnel will allow us to differentiate 
the extent of crowding-out: a neutral effect implies full and a positive effect partial crowding-
out of private R&D expenditures. Using firms’ R&D personnel instead of total R&D investment 
has the additional advantage that this measure implicitly controls for potential wage-adjust-
ments of R&D personnel as a result of a policy-induced demand shock for scientists (Goolsbee, 
1998).  
 An increase in the provincial human capital may also affect other economic variables in 
the provincial system in Equation (2) via economic secondary effects. First, the physical capital 
investment rate is assumed to be constant and thus unaffected by increases in R&D subsidies 
(e.g. Mankiw et al., 1992). Second, policy makers allocate R&D subsidies to incentivise corpo-
rate R&D investments to promote provincial technological growth.8 We assume that techno-
logical growth (gi) is determined by input factors that are effective in the provincial corporate 
research sector (e.g. Romer, 1990; Rivera-Batiz and Romer, 1991).9 In contrast to Romer 
(1990) and Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991), we allow public R&D subsidies (temporarily) to 
incentivise a varying input of human capital in the research sector (according to the accumula-
tion process of human capital in Equation (3)), which is assumed to be given in the original 
model setups. Third, the provincial employment rate is assumed to be fixed in the long run, 
temporary effects may depend on substitution and output effects.10 R&D subsidies to firms may 
lower the costs for R&D personnel (given elastic supply of human capital) and basic labour 
may become more expensive comparative to R&D personnel, which may lead to a substitution 
effect. Conversely, if R&D subsidies raise provincial output, they may subsequently also trigger 
                                                 
= 0.8834 (all provinces), ρ2 = 0.88 (Tibet excluded), ρ3 = 0.8707 (Tibet and provincial-status munici-
palities excluded). Correlation coefficients for logarithmised variables are even higher. 
8 R&D subsidies may predominantly foster human capital (investments) in the research sector (e.g. 
Romer, 1990) and thus one may argue that technological growth gi is a main target variable of R&D 
subsidies. For the reasons mentioned above, human capital is considered a main target variable (trans-
mission channel) of R&D subsidies; but, in line with the applied flexible empirical model, we do not 
discriminate between human capital that is either productive in a production or research sector (the 
dynamics of human capital in Equation (3) are modelled by Mankiw et al. (1992) for the production 
sector). A potential effect on the provincial patent rate (proxy for technological growth) is interpreted 
as secondary effect here.  
9 This assumption is consistent with our flexible empirical panel VAR approach that relates all variables 
in the economic system among each other. As emphasised by Romer (1990), the role of human capital 
in the research sector may be of particular importance for the accumulation of technology. Please note 
the distinction at this point between human capital in a one sector model with diminishing returns (e.g. 
Mankiw et al., 1992) and in a multiple sector model with a distinct role in the research sector (e.g. 
Romer, 1990), which has different implications of human capital for long-term economic growth. 
10 See Schalk and Untiedt (2000) for a brief discussion of substitution and output effects on regional 
employment in the context of physical capital subsidies in Germany.  
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a higher demand for labour (output effect). Lastly, shifts in the provincial per capita output can 
be written as a function of changes of provincial input factors presented in Equation (2) 
    
y. i
yi
 = α
k
.
i
ki
+ β
h
.
i
hi
+ (1-α-β) 
A
.
i
Ai
+ (1-α-β) 
λ
.
i
λi
.     (4) 
According to our theoretical framework, we expect provincial R&D subsidies to lead to a (tem-
porarily) higher human capital investment rate sh,i and level of human capital hi, given that firms 
are financially constrained. Moreover, positive secondary effects may arise especially on the 
provincial technological growth rate gi, on the provincial per capita output yi and employment 
rate λi. Due to substitution effects in the very short run, the latter effect is expected to arise after 
a phasing-in of several years. 
4. Empirical strategy, data and descriptive statistics 
4.1 Empirical strategy  
The VAR system that we model is composed of six equations with six dependent variables: (1) 
R&D subsidy intensity lsub, (2) human capital lprdef and lhk (proxied by private R&D invest-
ments or R&D personnel of LMEs), (3) technological growth rate lpat (provincial patents), (4) 
physical capital investment rate linvq (provincial investments in fixed assets), (5) employment 
rate lemp (provincial employed persons), and (6) real GDP per capita lgdp (provincial output). 
In order to investigate the total effects of Chinese R&D subsidies to the provincial corporate 
research sector, we consider not only direct effects (denoted by the estimate in a partial analysis 
approach) but also mutual indirect effects between the defined provincial variables. To this end, 
we propose a panel VAR and associated IRF analysis that allows us to determine the total ef-
fects of an increase in Chinese R&D subsidies on all provincial variables. 
The reduced-form VAR system, both flexible and atheoretical, can be specified com-
pactly in matrix notation (e.g. Love and Zicchino, 2006; Rickman, 2010) as 
yt = Ayt-1 + fi + tt + et.       (5) 
In Equation (5), yt denotes a vector of the six provincial endogenous variables [lsub, 
lprdef/lhk, lpat, linvq, lemp, lgdp], the matrix A is containing reduced-form coefficients, fi is a 
vector of provincial fixed effects to capture time constant heterogeneity, and tt is a vector of 
time dummies to capture general external (policy) shocks, respectively, while the vector et com-
prises (reduced-form) residuals (e.g. Love and Zicchino, 2006; Rickman, 2010). From a meth-
odological perspective, the inclusion of provincial fixed effects has the considerable advantage 
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that all time-invariant confounders at the province level and time-variant shocks at the macro 
level are controlled for.11 Such time-invariant attributes are, for example, the provincial climate, 
relief, geographical location, sea access and distances to other provinces and the provincial or 
national capital. To account for the influence of additional time-variant confounders, in Section 
5.2 we test the robustness of our model after augmenting several time-variant controls.  
As a response to criticism of the atheoretical reduced-form VAR approach, the structural 
VAR approach has been developed (e.g. Rickman, 2010), which can be formulated as 
Byt = Cyt-1 + fi + tt + Dεt.      (6) 
In Equation (6), the matrix B includes contemporaneous (structural) parameters, the 
matrix of polynomials C is connecting contemporaneous to time-lagged variables, and, even-
tually, diagonal matrix D links uncorrelated (exogenous) shocks εt to the provincial endogenous 
variables (e.g. Keating, 1992; Rickman, 2010).12 As Rickman (2010) points out, theory-based 
restrictions (see Section 3) in the structural VAR model are set on the matrix B. To this end, in 
order to identify our structural panel VAR approach, we follow Di Giacinto (2010), who ad-
vances an approach by Wold (1954) to presume a recursive causal ordering of the included 
provincial endogenous variables at period t (Choleski decomposition). Based on the developed 
theoretical framework in Section 3, we define the causal ordering at time t (see Figure 4). 
<<<  Figure 4      >>> 
Variables to the left (e.g. R&D subsidy intensity) have contemporaneous and delayed 
effects on the remaining provincial variables more to the right. Conversely, variables on the 
right have only time lagged (feedback) effects (e.g. GDP per capita). With respect to Equation 
(2), GDP per capita is the key outcome variable in the provincial system and thus the most 
endogenous variable with solely time lagged effects on the remaining provincial variables, 
while the investment rate and the employment rate are ordered on the basis of their flexibility 
in the short run and thus appear more to the left in Figure 4 (e.g. Eberle et al., 2019). We define 
the R&D subsidy intensity as the most exogenous variable in the provincial economic system. 
R&D subsidies are assumed to directly (contemporaneously) affect R&D investments and per-
sonnel of LMEs, which are seen as important input factor in knowledge production (Romer, 
                                                 
11 We are estimating six dynamic panel equations (in the reduced-form specification) incorporating pro-
vincial fixed effects, which is why the basic fixed-effects estimator suffers from a dynamic panel bias 
(Nickell, 1981). To account for this issue and to yield unbiased estimates, we use a bias-corrected fixed-
effects estimator that is proposed by Everaert and Pozzi (2007). 
12 Note that A = C*B-1 and et = εt*B-1 (Rickman, 2010). 
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1990) and thus directly affect provincial technological growth gi (patents), while labour and 
capital goods are assumed to trigger (delayed) secondary effects on gi. 
An important concern is reverse causality. If human capital determines R&D subsidies 
and not vice versa, a picking-the-winner strategy would imply a non-random allocation of pub-
lic funds to firms with more human capital and R&D investments and an upward bias of the 
estimated effect. Because this corresponds to a different causal ordering, in Section 5.2 we per-
form a robustness test to control for different effects of R&D subsidies on other variables in the 
economic system (this corresponds to a change of R&D subsidies and R&D investments and 
personnel of LMEs in Figure 4).  
 By applying the moving-average (MA) presentation of the VAR, we illustrate the re-
sponses (total effects) of the provincial variables to an orthogonal increase in the R&D subsidy 
intensity (Lütkepohl, 2005), while the calculated confidence intervals are based on Monte Carlo 
simulations (Love and Zicchino, 2006). 
4.2 Data 
The data is mainly obtained from China’s National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) and contains 
information at the province-year level observed between 2000 and 2010.13 Table 1 details var-
iable definitions and data sources, and in Appendix A1 we discuss some features of China’s 
officially reported data. In the remainder of this paper, we use the variable abbreviations pre-
sented in Table 1. Table A1 in the Appendix provides summary statistics of the six economic 
core variables. We construct real values for monetary output and investment measures by using 
the provincial consumer price index (CPI). Technological growth is measured by granted in-
vention patents obtained from China’s patent office (CNIPA).14 
     <<<  Table 1      >>> 
As a robustness test, we augment several time-variant provincial characteristics that may 
influence the coefficients of the core VAR variables. First, we control for non-LMEs R&D 
investments, mainly from universities and research institutes, in order to account for further 
                                                 
13 In 2011, the NBS survey was amended and the availability of consistent information on R&D invest-
ments and R&D personnel of LMEs restricts our analysis until 2010. LMEs are defined as firms with at 
least 300 employees, 30 million RMB sales revenue, and 40 million RMB assets (National Bureau of 
Statistics of China, 2003). 
14 In this context, we regard granted patents as a superior measure compared to patent applications, as 
granted patents have passed two selections. First, the expected economic value exceeds the cost of pa-
tenting (application), and second, the invention has passed examination at the patent office (grant). This 
two-step selection also helps to mitigate the distortion of application-based patent subsidies on patents 
as an indicator of technological growth in China. 
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determinants of technological growth at the province level. R&D personnel and private R&D 
investments of LMEs are likely to be correlated with non-LMEs R&D investments, and this 
may lead to omitted variable bias. Second, we include the ratio of private to state-owned firms 
and the ratio of loss-making state-owned firms. We hereby we aim to control for heterogeneity 
in financial constraints. In comparison to state-owned firms, China’s private firms are con-
strained in access to external finance, and among state-owned firms loss-making ones are more 
likely to encounter internal financial constraints. Third, we include the ratio of innovative LMEs 
to total LMEs as a measure for potential knowledge spillovers at the province level, because 
the expected value of firms’ R&D, and hence the decision to perform R&D, is also dependent 
on the degree of spillovers. Fourth, the ratios of the valued-added of the primary and the sec-
ondary sectors to total valued-added are added as indicators for the provincial economic com-
position. Fifth, provincial coal resources are added because these may absorb short-term ori-
ented investments to the detriment of long-term economic development, also known as resource 
curse, which would increase the opportunity cost of R&D. Finally, we aim to account for the 
presence of foreign R&D and technology. Hence, we control for the share of business R&D 
carried out by foreign invested enterprises and use the trade specialization index proposed by 
Li (2009) that measures export activities and the absorption of foreign technological 
knowledge, which is embodied in foreign goods. Moreover, the effect of patent subsidies on 
patenting has been well documented (Chen and Zhang 2019; Dang and Motohashi 2015; Li, 
2012) and thus we include provincial patent subsidies, to avoid substitution bias, in an addi-
tional robustness check (Heckman and Smith 1995). 
4.3 Descriptive statistics 
For each core variable in each province, we report the long-term growth rate from 2000 
to 2010 in Figure 5 and the summarised economic activities for the entire period 2000 to 2010 
in Table A2. Beijing, Shanghai, and Tianjin, which are relatively developed provincial-status 
municipalities, have the highest GDP per capita, as well as the highest patents-to-GDP ratio 
(Table A2). However, municipalities may benefit from agglomeration effects, and a comparison 
restricted to the remaining provinces provides a more conservative analysis. Developing prov-
inces with lower initial- and average GDP per capita show the highest growth in physical capital 
investments (e.g. Jiangxi, Anhui, or Liaoning; see Figure 5). More developed provinces, such 
as Zhejiang and Guangdong, have high growth rates in private R&D investments, R&D per-
sonnel, and patenting. As a stylised fact, and confirming theoretical predictions, this suggests 
that less developed provinces have relatively higher marginal returns to physical capital, 
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whereas more developed provinces pursue innovation to substitute capital- with technology-
driven growth.  
<<<  Figure 5     >>> 
R&D subsidies may be an important policy instrument to support the transition towards 
innovation and technology-led growth. Figure 6 shows that provinces that allocate higher levels 
of R&D subsidies also have higher levels of private R&D investments and receive more granted 
patents between 2000 and 2010 (scaled by real GDP). The pattern suggests that an increase in 
the intensity of R&D subsidies to GDP is accompanied by an increase in the private intensity 
of R&D and patents to GDP. While acknowledging that these figures do not allow for a causal 
interpretation, in the subsequent section we perform an analysis that addresses identification 
issues.  
     <<<  Figure 6     >>> 
5. Empirical results 
In this section we present the results of our panel VAR approach and the IRF analysis. To avoid 
having our results influenced by outliers, in the basic model we exclude Tibet and the munici-
palities Beijing, Chongqing, Shanghai, and Tianjin but include the municipalities in a robust-
ness test. Due to substantial economic dynamics in Chinese provinces, we apply a panel unit 
root test (Im et al., 2003) as a pre-estimation check to control for stationarity of the variables. 
As shown in Table 2, for some variables the test indicates non-stationarity, and thus we detrend 
these variables. 
     <<<  Table 2     >>> 
 As noted in Section 4.1, the econometric approach allows us to calculate the total (direct 
plus indirect) effects of an increase in public R&D subsidies on all economic variables in Equa-
tion (2). The total effects on private R&D investments and personnel of LMEs (captured by 
human capital in Equation (2)) are considered as primary effect because the human capital var-
iable is seen as primary transmission channel of Chinese R&D subsidies. Moreover, R&D sub-
sidies may have additional (unintended) effects on the remaining variables that are interpreted 
as economic secondary effects. 
5.1 Basic model 
In Figure 7, we investigate the total effect of R&D subsidies on the R&D personnel and private 
R&D investments of LMEs and total effects on our secondary variables. We report the reaction 
15 
 
of our core variables to an orthogonal increase in the R&D subsidy intensity in the amount of 
one standard deviation (multiplied by 100 [in %], y-axis). The figures illustrate the estimated 
responses by the solid lines and the dashed lines show the calculated confidence intervals for 
the various IRFs (x-axis denotes years). 
We start with the effect of R&D subsidies on R&D inputs of LMEs. Panel 1 shows that 
an increase in the R&D subsidy intensity leads to a contemporaneous significant negative effect 
on the private R&D investment rate, illustrated by the estimated response (solid line). The es-
timated error belts (dashed lines) reveal a significant negative effect in the short run, because 
both bounds are smaller than zero in the first years after a R&D subsidy shock. Panel 2 shows 
that an increase in the R&D subsidy intensity leads to a continuous positive effect on R&D 
personnel, while the confidence intervals suggest that this effect is only significant in the first 
year (5% and 95% confidence interval are larger than zero, see dashed lines). We interpret these 
findings as a contemporaneous partial crowding-out effect because firms substitute some pri-
vate funds with public funds, but total R&D inputs still increase.  
In addition to the effect on R&D, Panels 1 and 2 show that an increase in the R&D 
subsidy intensity has a significant positive effect on the provincial physical capital investment 
rate and patent activity (lower and upper bound of the estimated confidence intervals are above 
zero, see dashed lines). The effect on physical capital suggests that R&D subsidies have an 
effect on investments into assets, which may be research or non-research related, and we will 
explore this point further in Section 5.2. Increases in patents may be explained by a simultane-
ous increase in R&D inputs, emphasised by a closely related shape of the two response func-
tions (see Panel 2 of Figure 7).15 Moreover, the positive effects on the physical capital invest-
ment rate may also emanate positive secondary effects on patents. 
For the regional employment rate, we find a negative effect in the short run (solid line), 
potentially through substitution and adjustment effects, but a rather (insignificant) positive ef-
fect in the medium run (lower estimated confidence interval is below zero, while upper esti-
mated confidence interval is larger than zero). As for the real provincial GDP per capita, our 
results also suggests a short-run negative effect; however, the responses (solid line) in Panels 1 
and 2 show a delayed significant positive effect (dashed lines). In conclusion, there is some 
                                                 
15 Griliches (1990) mentions that the relationship between patents and R&D inputs “is close to contem-
poraneous with some lag effects which are small and not well estimated” (p. 1674). 
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evidence that R&D subsidies have a positive effect on the provincial economy in the medium 
run. 
     <<< Figure 7     >>> 
5.2 Robustness tests 
In this section we report six robustness tests. First, we augment our basic model with nine con-
trol variables to address a potential omitted variable bias by capturing time-variant heterogene-
ities of the provincial innovation and economic production systems. The additional control var-
iables in the first robustness test comprise provincial R&D investments carried out outside of 
the corporate sector, i.e by universities and research institutes, heterogeneity in financial con-
straints of firms (private firm activities, loss making state-owned firms), ratio of innovative 
LMEs, provincial sector composition, coal deposits, trade and foreign LME’s R&D activities 
(see Table 1 for a definition of the nine control variables). The results in Figure A1 confirm the 
significant negative contemporaneous effect on the private R&D investments of LMEs (Panel 
1) and a significant positive contemporaneous effect on R&D personnel (Panel 2). Furthermore, 
the effect on the patent activity turns insignificant, while the positive effect on the physical 
capital investment rate remains robust in both panels. The significant negative effects on the 
employment rate and GDP per capita are restricted to the short-term perspective, while the sig-
nificant positive effect on the GDP per capita diminishes in this setting.  
Second, to prevent that the estimated impact of R&D subsidies suffers from substitution 
bias, we augment our model with information for patent subsidies (see Figure A2). The esti-
mated magnitudes and significances of the core provincial innovation and economic variables 
to an increase in the R&D subsidy remain robust in both settings.  
Third, we account for changes in China’s innovation policy introduced after the Na-
tional Conference on Technological Innovation in 1999 (Liu et al., 2011). Because the enforce-
ment of national policies at the provincial level takes time, we extend the implementation period 
by three years and restrict our analysis to the years 2003 to 2010 (Figure A3).16 The effect on 
the private R&D investment rate of firms is still contemporaneously negative but turns insig-
nificant afterwards (Panel 1). The results also show that an increase in the R&D subsidy inten-
sity has a long-lasting significant positive effect on the R&D personnel of LMEs (Panel 2). The 
estimated response of the physical capital investment rate and the provincial patent activity 
                                                 
16 We also apply unit root tests for this time period before estimation. Note that we also detrend the 
variable linvq, although the unit root test reports stationarity for the time period 2003-2010; however, 
IRF analysis does not work otherwise.  
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remains significant positive. We do not find a significant effect on the employment rate, nor on 
the per capita income. These findings largely support our main results and indicate no substan-
tial increase in the effectiveness of R&D subsidies in more recent years. 
Fourth, we return to the question whether the effect of R&D subsidies on the physical 
capital investment rate suggests the use of R&D subsidies for non-research investments. We 
use investments in residential buildings as an indicator for short-term profit maximising invest-
ments, which, however, are unlikely to be complementary to R&D. Due to data limitations, this 
analysis is restricted to the years 2003 to 2010. The corresponding IRFs in Figure A4 show that 
a shock in the R&D subsidy intensity has a significant positive short-run effect on the invest-
ment rate in residential buildings. Thus, the results support that R&D subsidies are partially 
misallocated (or misused) to non-research investments. 
Fifth, we include provincial-status municipalities. We fail to note changes on the re-
sponses of our core variables, except for the employment rate and GDP per capita, which are a 
significant negative in the short term but convert into positive effects in the medium run (Figure 
A5). As a further sensitive analysis, we test the inclusion of the four municipalities in the time 
period 2003 to 2010. The significant positive effect on the R&D personnel employed in firms 
and the negative effect on the private R&D investments of LMEs remains robust (Figure A6). 
However, the positive response of the physical capital investment rate is non-significant in the 
setting where R&D inputs are measured by private R&D investments of firms (Panel 1). 
Sixth, different to our prior assumption that public funding has a rather exogenous effect 
on firms’ R&D personnel and private R&D investments, we now assume that R&D personnel 
and private R&D investments at time t endogenously determine the allocation of public funds. 
To this end, the causal ordering between human capital and R&D subsidies at time t in Figure 
4 is reversed. In the model, this restricts any potential effect of R&D subsidies on private R&D 
investments at time t to zero. The findings suggest that the effects of R&D subsidies on R&D 
personnel and private R&D investments are only of contemporaneous significance, as they dis-
appear in this setting (Figure A7). Firms instantaneously substitute own funds with public 
funds, while there is no effect in subsequent periods. Accordingly, there are no significant ef-
fects on the R&D personnel at all. The results confirm a contemporaneous effect of R&D sub-
sidies on R&D inputs of firms, while there is no crowding-out effect in subsequent time periods 
where the R&D activities remain constant. The significant positive effect on the patent activity, 
investment rate as well as partially on the real GDP per capita remains unchanged. 
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5.3 Discussion 
Our main empirical insight is that an increase of R&D subsidies significantly decreases private 
R&D investments, while there is a significant positive effect on the R&D personnel employed 
in firms. We interpret these findings as a partial crowding-out effect because public funds sub-
stitute some private funds while total R&D inputs still increase. Hence, R&D subsidies have 
not contributed to a rise in private R&D expenditures but led to an increase in total R&D inputs. 
This finding corroborates prior investigations of China’s R&D subsidies at the firm (Boeing, 
2016) and provincial level (Chen, 2018).  
In addition, we find positive secondary effects on the provincial patent activity and the 
investment rate in physical capital. Through increases in total R&D inputs, provincial econo-
mies benefit from technological progress and capital deepening. The former empirical finding 
especially confirms the prediction of our theoretical framework. What is more, we find some 
evidence for potentially unintended effects as R&D subsidies also increase the investment rate 
in residential buildings. Although investments in physical capital may be complementary to 
R&D in general, investments in residential buildings more likely suggests partial misallocation 
of R&D subsidies. This finding adds to an emerging literature on noncompliance among bene-
ficiaries of China’s R&D policy. Chen et al. (2018) investigate adverse selection in the admis-
sion to the InnoCom program, which awards corporate tax cuts to firms with an R&D intensity 
above a certain threshold. To become eligible, many firms relabel non-R&D expenses as R&D 
and this leads to an inflation of the reported R&D investment by 30%. Boeing and Peters (2019) 
investigate moral hazard behavior in firms after grant assignment. They show that a partial 
crowding-out effect of R&D subsidies on R&D expenditures among grantees turns to an addi-
tionality effect for compliant firms, i.e. firms without moral hazard issues. Interestingly, they 
also show that misappropriated R&D subsidies are partially used for investments in physical 
capital. In particular, real-estate investments seem to increase the opportunity cost of R&D in-
vestment in China. Based on data for manufacturing firms in 35 Chinese cities, Rong et al. 
(2016) find that housing price appreciation creates opportunities for high earnings of real estate 
investments. For this reason, manufacturing firms enhance diversification in the real estate sec-
tor and thereby decrease investments in innovation, which may provide a possible explanation 
for the effect of R&D subsidies on the investment rate in residential buildings. 
In general, our findings imply that China’s R&D subsidies have effectively stimulated 
R&D activities of firms, as well as further economic activities of provinces, but failed to in-
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crease private R&D funding. Although a first-order goal of China’s innovation policy is to in-
crease R&D activities in firms, this goal could be reached more efficiently under an addition-
ality rather than partial crowding-out regime. Thus, a crucial question is how to improve 
China’s R&D policy towards a higher effectiveness in stimulating private R&D expenditures. 
Below we discuss three potential avenues.  
First, rigorous monitoring may increase the odds of R&D subsidies being invested in 
research, instead of non-research, and this is a necessary condition for any effect on R&D ac-
tivities. Second, selection of financially constrained recipients and strict monitoring of funding 
contract rules, especially in the case of matching grants, reduces the risk that public funds be-
come a substitute for private funds. Even if grantees fulfilled matching criteria of supported 
R&D projects by using private funds from non-supported R&D projects, this reallocation does 
not lead to crowding out of private funds. Third, China’s increasing emphasis on mission-ori-
ented R&D programmes bears the risk of disproportionally lower marginal returns to supported 
projects relative to non-supported projects. A strict mission-oriented policy may enhance gov-
ernment failure in the identification of R&D projects with the highest social returns and results 
in resource misallocation to the detriment of welfare and growth. Rigorous ex-post evaluation 
will help to identify and adjust ineffective policies in time. 
6. Conclusion 
In this study, we investigate the impact of R&D subsidies on R&D inputs of large- and medium-
sized firms in Chinese provinces. A panel VAR model and corresponding IRF analysis allow 
us to differentiate between direct and indirect effects, which add up to total effects. Based on 
this approach we can identify the impact of R&D subsidies on additional measures of provincial 
innovation and economic performance. A main result is that R&D subsidies fail to incentivise 
private R&D expenditures while firms increase the total employment of R&D personnel. We 
interpret these findings as a partial crowding-out effect because public funds substitute some 
private funds while total R&D inputs still increase. Beyond that, we gain novel insights into 
additional transmission channels of R&D subsidies. Notably, we find positive effects on 
measures of technological progress, capital deepening, and growth, while there is a negative 
effect on employment in the short run. Politically unintended effects of R&D subsidies on in-
vestments in residential buildings suggests partial misallocation of public funds. 
There are several avenues how future research may address issues that were beyond the 
scope of this study. First, one may incorporate spatial information to account for the distance 
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between provinces, for example, to identify the role of knowledge spillovers from more to less 
innovative regions. Second, it is of interest if the effect of R&D policy on national growth is 
accompanied by changes in regional disparities across provinces and whether future policy 
should follow a picking-the-winner or aiding-the-poor scheme. Finally, it may be worthwhile 
to carry out our analysis at the sub-provincial level once the required data becomes available. 
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Tables 
Table 1  
Variable descriptions and data sources. 
Variable abbre-
viation Description Data sources 
Core variables VAR model 
lgdp (y) Real GDP per capita (per resident population). CPIs are used 
to calculate real values. 
National Bureau of Statistics of China, online data base 
(http://data.stats.gov.cn/english) 
lemp (λ) Employment rate (Number of employed persons at year-end 
by region per capita (per resident population)). 
Missing data for 2003 and 2006 are calculated on the basis 
of the formula: (Employed Personst-1 + Employed Per-
sonsit+1)/2 
National Bureau of Statistics of China, China statistical yearbook 
(various  years), available online 
(http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/statisticaldata/annualdata/) 
linvq (sk) Real investments in fixed assets per real GDP. National Bureau of Statistics of China, online data base 
(http://data.stats.gov.cn/english) 
lhk (h) R&D personnel LMEs per capita (per resident population). Statistics yearbook on science and technology activities of indus-
trial enterprises (various years) 
lprdef (sh_private) Private real R&D investments LMEs per real GDP (R&D 
subsidies subtracted from R&D investments LMEs). 
Statistics yearbook on science and technology activities of indus-
trial enterprises (various years) 
lpat (g) Patents per 100 Mio. real GDP (Granted Patents, Invention). CNIPA (various years), online available 
(http://www.sipo.gov.cn/tjxx/jianbao/) 
lsub (sh_public) Real R&D subsidies to LMEs per real GDP. Statistics yearbook on science and technology activities of indus-
trial enterprises (various years) 
Control variables VAR model (robustness checks) 
lcontrol1 Real non-firm R&D investments per real GDP. Statistics yearbook on science and technology activities of indus-
trial enterprises (various years) 
lcontrol2 Ratio private firms to state-owned firm. National Bureau of Statistics of China, online data base 
(http://data.stats.gov.cn/english) 
lcontrol3 Ratio loss making state-owned firms to total state owned 
firms. 
National Bureau of Statistics of China, online data base 
(http://data.stats.gov.cn/english) 
lcontrol4 Ratio innovative LMEs to total LMEs. Statistics yearbook on science and technology activities of indus-
trial enterprises (various years) 
lcontrol5 and lcontrol6 Ratio valued-added sector 1 and sector 2, respectively, to to-
tal value-added. 
National Bureau of Statistics of China, online data base 
(http://data.stats.gov.cn/english) 
lcontrol7 Ratio coal deposit to total coal deposit China. Figures of 
2003 used for missing earlier years.  
National Bureau of Statistics of China, online data base 
(http://data.stats.gov.cn/english) 
control8 (not in ln) Exports minus imports as share of the sum of ex- and im-
ports: (Exportsi – Importsi) / (Exportsi + Importsi).  
National Bureau of Statistics of China, online data base 
(http://data.stats.gov.cn/english) 
lcontrol9 Ratio of foreign to total R&D investments of LMEs. China statistical yearbook on science and technology, Statistics 
yearbook on science & technology activities of industrial enter-
prises (various years) 
patsub (not in ln) Binary indicator that takes the value of 1 if a province pro-
vides patent subsidies. 
Li (2012). 
linvq_rb Real investments in residential buildings per real GDP. National Bureau of Statistics of China, online data base 
(http://data.stats.gov.cn/english) 
Notes: All variables are in logarithms, except trade specialization (control8) and patent subsidies (patsub).
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Table 2 
Panel unit root tests. 
  
Years IPS test-statistic p-value 
lgdp 11 2.91 0.998 
lgdp_det 11 -2.31 0.011 
lemp 11 0.88 0.810 
lemp_det 11 -4.02 0.000 
linvq 11 -1.25 0.105 
linvq_det 11 -4.76 0.000 
lhk 11 -2.10 0.018 
lnrdef 11 -3.32 0.000 
lpat 11 1.36 0.913 
lpat_det 11 -7.04 0.000 
lsub 11 -6.23 0.000 
Notes: Panel unit root tests are based on Im et al. (2003) for the core variables over the time period 2000-2010. The outliers Beijing, 
Shanghai, Tianjin, Chongqing and Tibet are excluded. The null hypothesis (H0) states that panels comprise unit roots, the alternative 
hypothesis (HA) states that panels are stationary. We add to the detrended variables the suffix “_det”. Control variables are also 
detrended if the unit root test reports non-stationarity 
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Figures 
Figure 1  
Dynamics of private real R&D investments LMEs and total real R&D investments per real GDP in China. 
 
Notes: Own calculations based on aggregated provincial data. Data on total provincial R&D investments are based on China’s 
statistical yearbook on science and technology activities of industrial enterprises (various years). For the remaining variables see 
Table 1.  
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Figure 2 
Dynamics of private real R&D investments LMEs and real R&D subsidies in China. 
 
Notes: Own calculations based on aggregated provincial data (see Table 1). Absolute values are presented. 
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Figure 3 
Dynamics of innovation activities by LMEs in China. 
 
Notes: Own calculations based on aggregated provincial data. Data on total provincial R&D investments and total provincial R&D 
personnel are based on China’s statistics yearbook on science and technology activities of industrial enterprises (various years). For 
the remaining variables see Table 1. Ratio per total real R&D investments and ratio per total R&D personnel is presented. 
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Figure 4 
Defined causal ordering across the provincial variables at time t (contemporaneous linkages). 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Own illustration.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Number of contemporaneous linkages to other variables at time t. 
lhk (4) 
 
lprdef (4) 
 
lgdp (0) lemp (1) linvq (2) lsub (5) lpat (3)    
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Figure 5 
Provincial changes from 2000 to 2010 for various economic indicators (in %). 
 
Notes: Own calculations based on provincial data (see Table 1). 
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Figure 6 
Scatterplot average private real R&D investments LMEs per real GDP (left panel) and average patents per 100 Mio. real GDP (right 
panel) in relation to average real R&D subsidies to LMEs per real GDP (values for the entire period 2000 to 2010). 
 
Notes: Own calculations based on provincial data (see Table 1). The shortcuts for the provinces are: AH: Anhui, BJ: Beijing, CQ: 
Chongqing, FJ: Fujian, GS: Gansu, GD: Guangdong, GX: Guangxi, GZ: Guizhou, HI: Hainan, HE: Hebei, HL: Heilongjiang, HA: 
Henan, HB: Hubei, HN: Hunan, NM: Inner Mongolia, JS: Jiangsu, JX: Jiangxi, JL: Jilin, LN: Liaoning, NX: Ningxia, QH: Qinghai, 
SN: Shaanxi, SD: Shandong, SH: Shanghai, SX: Shanxi, SC: Sichuan, TJ: Tianjin, XZ: Tibet, XJ: Xinjiang, YN: Yunnan, ZJ: 
Zhejiang. 
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Figure 7 
IRF analysis for an increase in R&D subsidy intensity (lsub), 2000-2010. 
1. Private real R&D investments LMEs per real GDP (lprdef) 
 
2. R&D personnel LMEs per capita (lhk) 
 
Notes: The solid lines are the estimated IRFs, while the dashed lines illustrate the 95 % confidence intervals that are calculated by 
conducting Monte Carlo simulations (500 repetitions). 
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Appendix 
Appendix A1 
Data properties. 
The use of China’s provincial data is not without challenges, and in this section we briefly discuss 
some main issues.  
1. Due to a decentralised accounting approach, the sum of provincial GDP is not equal to China’s 
national GDP. For example, data on the national GDP is approximately 5.9 % smaller compared to 
the summed provincial GDP for the year 2010. Differences also applies to employed persons, pop-
ulation, investments in fixed assets and patents in our data. 
2. NBS calculates resident population data for the years 2000, 2001 and 2010 based on the National 
Population Census 2000 and 2010, while data for the remaining years is based on annual national 
sample surveys on population changes. According to the National Population Census in 2010, pop-
ulation data for Beijing (2006 to 2009) as well as for Tibet (2001 to 2009) was corrected in retro-
spect and we use the corrected data.  
3. Data on the employed persons by regions is obtained from various issues of China’s Statistical 
Yearbooks. As mentioned in Table 1, there is no data available for the years 2003 and 2006. Until 
the year 2010, the annual provincial data is based on the National Population Census in 2000, as 
well as on the annual Sample Survey on Labour Force. Data for the year 2010 is based on the 
National Population Census 2010 and the annual Sample Survey on Labour Force (similar to the 
data on resident population). According to the novel Census in 2010, data on the national wide 
employed persons is also corrected in retrospect for the period 2001 to 2009. However, corrected 
data on provincial level is, to our knowledge, not available. The modifications on national level 
show only moderate differences (e.g. modified data on the employed persons on national level is 
1.55 % smaller for the year 2005), implying that modified data on provincial level would be slightly 
smaller than the applied extrapolated provincial data in this study. 
4. The data on the R&D personnel and investments of LMEs was collected from the Statistics year-
book on science and technology activities of industrial enterprises (various years). In order to en-
sure the consistency of the time series, we calculate the annual sum by aggregating the provincial 
values. The calculated national value for both variables corresponds in each year to the variables 
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“Full time Equivalent of R&D Personnel” and “Expenditure on R&D” in the category “Basic Sta-
tistics on Science and Technology Activities of Large and Medium-sized Industrial Enterprises” in 
various Chinese Statistical Yearbooks. This confirms the consistency of our main R&D variables. 
5. The patent data from China’s patent office CNIPA (formally State Intellectual Property Office 
of China (SIPO)) is equal to the published provincial data by the NBS, only for the provinces 
Zhejiang and Guangzhou the patent count differs by one patent.  
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Table A1 
Summary statistics, 2000-2010. 
(1) All Provinces 
  Observations Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
gdp 341 17525.02 13130.93 13448.59 2755.85 72296.29 
emp 341 0.5128 0.5114 0.0741 0.3637 0.7324 
invq 341 0.4909 0.4636 0.1577 0.2576 0.9339 
hk 341 0.0005 0.0004 0.0005 0 0.0026 
prdef 341 0.0045 0.0039 0.0031 0 0.0147 
pat 341 0.0884 0.0614 0.0996 0 0.8133 
sub 341 0.0005 0.0004 0.0005 0 0.0039 
(2) Without Tibet 
  Observations Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
gdp 330 17792.19 13483.73 13572.57 2755.85 72296.29 
emp 330 0.5127 0.5115 0.0751 0.3637 0.7324 
invq 330 0.4826 0.4495 0.1523 0.2576 0.9339 
hk 330 0.0005 0.0004 0.0005 0.00001 0.0026 
prdef 330 0.0047 0.0039 0.0030 0.0001 0.0147 
pat 330 0.0906 0.0636 0.1004 0.0093 0.8133 
sub 330 0.0005 0.0004 0.0005 0.0000009 0.0039 
(3) Without municipalities 
  Observations Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
gdp 297 14695.55 12246.18 9398.49 2755.85 50716.66 
emp 297 0.5129 0.5116 0.0687 0.3637 0.7324 
invq 297 0.4977 0.4752 0.1607 0.2576 0.9339 
hk 297 0.0004 0.0003 0.0004 0 0.0026 
prdef 297 0.0041 0.0036 0.0028 0 0.0132 
pat 297 0.0664 0.0561 0.0429 0 0.3068 
sub 297 0.0005 0.0003 0.0005 0 0.0039 
(4) Without municipalities and Tibet 
  Observations Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
gdp 286 14895 12338.08 9492.73 2755.85 50716.66 
emp 286 0.5129 0.5116 0.0696 0.3637 0.7324 
invq 286 0.4885 0.4704 0.1552 0.2576 0.9339 
hk 286 0.0004 0.0003 0.0004 0.00001 0.0026 
prdef 286 0.0042 0.0036 0.0027 0.0001 0.0132 
pat 286 0.0681 0.0581 0.0426 0.0093 0.3068 
sub 286 0.0005 0.0004 0.0005 0.0000009 0.0039 
Notes: Own calculations based on provincial data (see Table 1). Summary statistics are shown for the variables before ln-transfor-
mation and before detrending. 
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Table A2 
Summarised economic activities of Chinese provinces, 2000-2010. 
Province Province code 
Real GDP per 
capita (in 
RMD) 
Employment 
rate (in %) 
Real invest-
ments in fixed 
assets per real 
GDP (in %) 
Private real 
R&D invest-
ments LMEs 
per real GDP 
(in %) 
R&D personnel 
LMEs per cap-
ita (%) 
Patents per 100 
Mio. real GDP 
Real R&D sub-
sidies to LMEs 
per real GDP 
(%) 
Anhui AH 9931.11 57.63 64.99 0.53 0.03 0.06 0.06 
Beijing BJ 47487.28 60.40 39.24 0.61 0.12 0.57 0.06 
Chongqing CQ 13838.82 61.58 64.19 0.59 0.05 0.09 0.06 
Fujian FJ 21119.31 53.34 42.87 0.55 0.06 0.05 0.02 
Gansu GS 8355.77 52.03 54.59 0.40 0.03 0.07 0.04 
Guangdong GD 26118.49 50.59 30.95 1.00 0.11 0.17 0.03 
Guangxi GX 9664.27 56.56 51.88 0.26 0.01 0.04 0.02 
Guizhou GZ 6164.53 59.47 55.21 0.33 0.01 0.08 0.08 
Hainan HI 12557.51 46.24 47.12 0.06 0.00 0.05 0.00 
Hebei HE 15589.74 51.48 53.15 0.39 0.03 0.04 0.01 
Heilongjiang HL 15125.84 43.25 42.54 0.45 0.06 0.10 0.08 
Henan HA 12159.59 60.03 52.80 0.44 0.04 0.05 0.02 
Hubei HB 13366.52 47.46 49.68 0.59 0.05 0.11 0.04 
Hunan HN 11743.63 56.40 46.46 0.43 0.03 0.10 0.03 
Inner Mongolia NM 20497.95 44.04 65.77 0.27 0.03 0.02 0.03 
Jiangsu JS 26810.00 52.37 47.31 1.04 0.12 0.11 0.04 
Jiangxi JX 10653.52 48.70 64.57 0.48 0.03 0.04 0.06 
Jilin JL 15600.97 41.25 65.99 0.35 0.03 0.10 0.02 
Liaoning LN 21680.34 46.85 62.56 0.84 0.08 0.12 0.09 
Ningxia NX 12574.28 50.34 72.49 0.40 0.03 0.06 0.06 
Qinghai QH 11595.21 48.95 65.93 0.31 0.02 0.04 0.04 
Shaanxi SN 12436.36 51.15 60.92 0.47 0.06 0.14 0.20 
Shandong SD 21597.89 54.89 49.67 0.95 0.07 0.07 0.03 
Shanghai SH 50526.30 42.75 35.26 1.13 0.15 0.27 0.05 
Shanxi SX 13576.99 44.75 50.49 0.52 0.05 0.07 0.05 
Sichuan SC 10321.21 56.96 58.13 0.39 0.03 0.09 0.06 
Tianjin TJ 39663.56 40.69 50.41 1.13 0.13 0.20 0.03 
Tibet XZ 9682.03 51.59 78.14 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.00 
Xinjiang XJ 13864.87 37.78 54.99 0.20 0.02 0.03 0.02 
Yunnan YN 8664.30 56.43 56.94 0.16 0.01 0.08 0.02 
Zhejiang ZJ 28861.31 65.49 45.65 0.72 0.10 0.13 0.03 
Notes: Own calculations based on provincial data (see Table 1). 
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Figure A1 
IRF analysis for an increase in R&D subsidy intensity (lsub), 2000-2010 (control variables included). 
1. Private real R&D investments LMEs per real GDP (lprdef) 
 
2. R&D personnel LMEs per capita (lhk) 
 
Notes: The solid lines are the estimated IRFs, while the dashed lines illustrate the 95 % confidence intervals that are calculated by 
conducting Monte Carlo simulations (500 repetitions) 
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Figure A2 
IRF analysis for an increase in R&D subsidy intensity (lsub), 2000-2010 (patent subsidies included as control variable, lpatsub). 
1. Private real R&D investments LMEs per real GDP (lprdef) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. R&D personnel LMEs per capita (lhk) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: The solid lines are the estimated IRFs, while the dashed lines illustrate the 95 % confidence intervals that are calculated by 
conducting Monte Carlo simulations (500 repetitions) 
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Figure A3 
IRF analysis for an increase in R&D subsidy intensity (lsub), 2003-2010. 
1. Private real R&D investments LMEs per real GDP (lprdef)
 
2. R&D personnel LMEs per capita (lhk) 
  
Notes: The solid lines are the estimated IRFs, while the dashed lines illustrate the 95 % confidence intervals that are calculated by 
conducting Monte Carlo simulations (500 repetitions) 
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Figure A4 
IRF analysis for an increase in R&D subsidy intensity (lsub), 2003-2010 (linvq_rb denotes investment rate in residential buildings). 
1. Private real R&D investments LMEs per real GDP (lprdef) 
 
2. R&D personnel LMEs per capita (lhk) 
 
Notes: The solid lines are the estimated IRFs, while the dashed lines illustrate the 95 % confidence intervals that are calculated by 
conducting Monte Carlo simulations (500 repetitions) 
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Figure A5 
IRF analysis for an increase in R&D subsidy intensity (lsub), 2000-2010 (Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin and Chongqing included). 
1. Private real R&D investments LMEs per real GDP (lprdef) 
 
2. R&D personnel LMEs per capita (lhk) 
 
Notes: The solid lines are the estimated IRFs, while the dashed lines illustrate the 95 % confidence intervals that are calculated by 
conducting Monte Carlo simulations (500 repetitions) 
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Figure A6 
IRF analysis for an increase in R&D subsidy intensity (lsub), 2003-2010 (Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin and Chongqing included). 
1. Private real R&D investments LMEs per real GDP (lprdef) 
 
2. R&D personnel LMEs per capita (lhk) 
 
Notes: The solid lines are the estimated IRFs, while the dashed lines illustrate the 95 % confidence intervals that are calculated by 
conducting Monte Carlo simulations (500 repetitions) 
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Figure A7 
IRF analysis for an increase in R&D subsidy intensity (lsub), 2000-2010 (Changed causal ordering). 
1. Private real R&D investments LMEs per real GDP (lprdef) 
 
2. R&D personnel LMEs per capita (lhk) 
 
Notes: The solid lines are the estimated IRFs, while the dashed lines illustrate the 95 % confidence intervals that are calculated by 
conducting Monte Carlo simulations (500 repetitions) 
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